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In line with governance trends around the world, a growing number of expressways in the 
People’s Republic of China are managed as Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). The tremendous 
growth in demand for mobility in newly emerging economies has led to a gap between 
investment needs and available public funding. Using private funds is potentially helpful in 
closing this gap and accommodating the social and economic needs of motorization. By some, it 
is also hoped that contracting-out and involvement of the private sector will lead to higher 
transparency and accountability. However, in line with what has been found in various transport 
infrastructure modes, during uncertain and hazy transition periods that arise after infrastructure 
reforms, many forms of potentially pernicious strategic behaviour can pop up. Strategic 
behaviour emerges from information a-symmetry between private and public players, where the 
former act as agents and the latter as principals. In this article, China’s evidence on various types 
of strategic behaviour in the management of expressways is found. Several PPP projects for 
expressways in China are investigated empirically. And conclusions are drawn as to what 
possible cures are effective countermeasures of strategic behaviour, and what are the implications 
for Europe. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past decade, public investments in expressway infrastructure in China have seen 
remarkable growth, but their actual percentage of total expressway-construction costs has 
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declined (World Bank, 2007; China Statistics Bureau, 2007). The gap between the availability of 
public funding and actual project construction and to a lesser extent maintenance costs has been 
filled by raising growing sums of money from the private sector. Meanwhile, important 
responsibilities for the design, construction, maintenance and operation of expressways have 
been transferred to the private sector after signing contracts calling into life so-called Public-
Private Partnerships (PPPs). PPPs, which originated in Anglo-Saxon countries and have 
subsequently spread around the world, are believed to offer the possibility of absorbing the 
strengths of the private sector, especially innovativeness and efficiency, without relinquishing 
public control and respecting public values (European Commission 2003; OECD 2001; OECD 
2002; OECD and International Transport Forum 2008). Since the late 1990s, the growth in the 
number of PPPs for roads, especially for expressways programmed in the Chinese National 
Expressway Network Plan, has speeded up, from 0 to 122 PPP contracts at present (China Audit 
Office, 2008). The underlying reason for PPP’s increased popularity is, apart from merits 
mentioned above, rising motorization and a concomitant requirement for road network extension 
and thus substantially higher funding needs. 
However, as we know from various evaluation studies on the use of PPP around the world in 
various policy fields (World Bank and Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Faculty 2004, 2005; 
Transparency International 2007; Chang et al 2005; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2006; 
German Institute of Urban Affairs 2006; European Parliament 2005, 2006; Price WaterHouse 
Coopers 2008; Andreas et al 2005; Levainen and Altes 2005; Andriani et al 2006; Ministry of 
Economy and Finance of Greece 2006; Engel et al 2003; Li et al 2005), the evidence on the merits of 
PPP is not exclusively positive. Often the explanation given for disappointments is that 
partnerships in which government contract activities out to private players can be characterized 
as principal-agent relations (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Jensen 2000, Buckley and Michie 1996, 
HM Treasury 2003, 2005; World Bank and Economic Commission for Africa, 2003). As a 
consequence, the asymmetric distribution of information evokes ‘strategic behaviour’ on the part 
of agents leading to higher costs and lower benefits than the preference function of the principal 
would justify (ten Heuvelhof et al 2009). For instance, contractors may tell only half-truths about 
their abilities when making bids. Alternatively, they refrain from making serious efforts to 
provide good service levels or otherwise refuse to behave in line with the interests of the public 
client if the chance of detection of shirking is low enough and/or sanctions absent or not serious 
enough to deter them from doing that. To put it in agency theory terms: adverse selection of 
contractors may occur during the tendering process, whereas moral hazard is likely to arise 
during the contracting period itself. The theory of strategic behaviour, which we will use here, 
has agency theory as its theoretical point of departure, but has been worked out to deal with the 
vagaries of actual actor behaviour in the world of the infrastructures, where self-interest can be 
made tangible by looking at aspects such as hard to pinpoint delaying tactics, playing with the 
ambiguity in the interpretation of legal concepts and spreading selective, biased, incomplete and 
overwhelming amounts of information, the evil intentions behind which are hard or impossible 
to demonstrate (ten Heuvelhof et al 2009). In short, strategic behaviour is hard to prove in terms 
of its explicitly bad intentions, normally not (yet) illegal, but morally doubtful and potentially 
harmful to the broader public interest (de Jong and Stout 2007). 
And yet, as will appear below, these features can be found in PPP projects in China in various 
forms. Firstly, private enterprises show narrow self-interest in their focus on profit maximization, 
when they regularly harm consumer interests by embezzling public funds, delivering lower 
service quality than specified, charge more toll money than they are supposed to and cut back on 
maintenance expenses as long as they can get away with it. Secondly, utilizing the ambiguity in 
the way their conduct can be interpreted, agents argue that mistakes and omissions were not 
intentional or not necessarily harmful. Thirdly, when submitting bids for a tender and/or 
drafting a contract, public clients and private agents reflect on and anticipate each other’s actions, 
make tactical choices and bargain and renegotiate cost estimates, quality standards, project 
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output specifications, project completion dates and financial risk allocations. Contracts are 
virtually always incomplete and both parties are unable to foresee all future contingencies at the 
moment of formulation and signing. During the implementation, contracts need further 
adjustment; this time aspect can be utilized to obtain extra gains, especially by agents whose 
involvement has become indispensable to project completion. 
The purpose of this article is to explore different types of strategic behaviour in the management 
of expressways and propose corresponding countermeasures. We will answer the following 
questions. First, what is the empirical evidence regarding various forms of strategic behaviour in 
the management of expressways? And what can be possible cures? Second, to what extent can 
the agency theory, developed in a western style, be applied in the Chinese context? And third, 
since this type of research on expressways has not yet been conducted in Europe, we raise the 
question to what extent a similar map of strategic behaviour might also exist in Europe. 
Collecting data on this subject is generally sensitive, and this is even more so in a country with a 
much shorter tradition of open communication between government and industry on the one 
hand and university researchers on the other (Zheng et al 2010). Only rarely are actors involved 
willing to lift the lid off what is seen as the suspicious side of politics and business. Remarkably, 
we were able, through personal and professional networks, to conduct face-to-face interviews 
with experts and professionals from organizations operating in this field. We have been lucky 
enough to obtain some non-official (‘listed’) reports and interview a number of officials willing to 
be open to us, in the office as well as over dinner. The names of the reports, which are obviously 
all in Mandarin, can be found under the references. The names of the interviewees are mentioned 
in appendix 1. In section 2, we present our theoretical assumptions, and produce a conceptual 
model with the various stages PPPs go through, which will enable us to pinpoint the various 
moments when strategic behaviour might emerge. One might say that these moments are ideal 
breeding grounds for tactical manoeuvring on the part of contractors. In subsequent section 3, 
which is based on national reports and experts and policy-makers at the national level, the 
different types of strategic behaviour as they can be found in road management by PPP in China 
are presented. Section 4 then tells the stories of three individual cases studies in three different 
provinces around China. It appears that both among public principals and among private agents 
strategic behaviour can be found. In section 5, suggestions for law-makers to install institutional 
incentives to mitigate the perversities resulting from strategic behaviour are offered. In the 
concluding section, we formulate our ideas on the implications of the Chinese findings for the 
European context. Do the same or similar forms of strategic behaviour also occur in Western PPP 
practice for road management, or is it ‘cleaner’ than Chinese decision-making on transport 
infrastructures? 
2. Theory and method 
Public-private partnership has been defined in many different ways (Flyvbjerg et al 2003; 
Koppenjan, 2008; Hodge and Greve, 2005; Grimsey and Lewis, 2002), but there is a general 
agreement that PPP projects involve private players in the design, construction, operation and 
maintenance of a public infrastructure on the basis of long-term contracts or arrangements. Some 
definitions focus mainly on the aspect of private finance, while others give it a more 
comprehensive interpretation in which the allocation, sharing and management of various tasks 
are included (Miller and Lessard, 2000; Li et al., 2005; Devapriya, 2006; Pakkala et al., 2007). 
Although there is no determinate and unified definition of PPP, on the one hand, we may say 
that PPP is a kind of contractual relationship between governments and private players, working 
together to finish a target project with their own objectives and interests. The delegation of some 
governmental responsibilities to the private sector, under their divergent goals, may raise our 
attention to how these tasks are subsequently dealt with. PPP as a general concept can be 
EJTIR 10(1), March 2010, pp. 42-62 
Mu, de Jong and ten Heuvelhof 
45 
A Typology of Strategic Behaviour in PPPs for Expressways:  
Lessons from China and Implications for Europe 
 
subdivided into many different forms of procurement models. Usually, the sequence in phases 
on which typologies of procurement models are based are Design (D), Build (B), Maintain (M), 
Operate (O), Manage (also M) and Rehabilitate (R). Earlier approaches separated all of these 
phases in different contracts granted to different actors; today it is more common that they are 
merged into one contract. In addition, several aspects pertinent to contracting or construction that 
have not been covered under the above terms are sometimes incorporated in the wealth of 
procurement model acronyms. The main ones are Finance (F), Bid (also B), Develop (also D), 
Transfer (T), Lease (L), Upgrade (U), Purchase (P) and Own (also O). The rather traditional 
Design-Bid-Build would for instance be abbreviated to the simple acronym DBB, while a well-
known more modern procurement model focusing on the entire infrastructure life cycle reads as 
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT). An arrangement where ownership permanently remains with the 
private sector would be Build-Operate-Own (BOO), and if it is transferred back to the state after a 
number of years, it would be Build-Operate-Own-Transfer (BOOT). Figure 1 summarizes the 
different forms of PPP and their positions on the public-private spectrum. Not all of the above 
mentioned procurement models are currently being applied in China. The most commonly used 
forms in China are Build-Transfer (BT), Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and various forms of joint 
ventures. 
On the other hand, PPP is also a trust relationship between governments and private players 
(Parker and Hartley 2003; Walker et al 2006; Teegen 1999; Bstieler and Hemmert 2007). In this 
relationship, a trusted party is presumed to implement policies, ethical codes, laws and their 
previous promises. Governments and private players get together in a partnership since they 
have confidence that the behaviour of their partner(s) will be in conformity with predefined 
contractual terms. Government is trusted to draft project requirements and the private players 
are trusted to fulfil the responsibilities transferred to them as stipulated. In addition, PPP is also 
regarded as an avenue of sharing project risks between the partners and the risks should be 
allocated to the partners who can bear them best, implying that players deal with those types of 
risks they can deal with best. Lastly, it is argued that PPP to bring more “value for money” to 
projects. This surplus obtained from partnerships may at least be partly explained by the trust 
relation between governments and private players which diminishes transaction costs.  
 
Figure 1. Forms of PPP and degrees of private involvement (De Jong et al. 2010) 
 
According to Jensen (2000), agency theory involves the study where there is a contract in which a 
client or principal engages an agent or contractor to take actions on behalf of the principal that 
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involve the delegation of some decision-making authority to the agent. With its basic 
assumptions of asymmetric information and goal conflict (Caers et al, 2006), it is reasonable to 
believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal. At its core, this is 
the source of strategic behaviour. In A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (1998), 
Laffont and Tirole define two main categories of strategic behaviour, adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Adverse selection emerges when agents possess more exogenous information than 
principals, such as technological options and actual project costs, which enables them to extract a 
rent from principals even if their bargaining power is poor. In effect, adverse selection is ex ante-
contractual strategic behaviour, which usually takes place during the tendering process and 
induces principals to select sub-optimal contractors. Moral hazard is ex post-contractual strategic 
behaviour referring to endogenous variables of private agents, which cannot (easily) be observed 
by principals. Private agents take discretionary actions such as a reduction in service effort and 
artificially increasing project costs. In infrastructure projects, moral hazard usually occurs during 
project implementation. Consequently, adequate incentives and monitoring by public principals 
need to be strengthened, although this can be costly.  
Agency theory has been a vital source of inspiration for the more recent publications on strategic 
behaviour (ten Heuvelhof et al, 2009) and can help to understand perversities arising in PPP 
projects. It is found that agency theory is able to manifest many types of strategic behaviour that 
the public sector faces when it attempts to contract out. Agency theory is also found to offer 
unique explanations for the public sector’s choice and use of certain incentives and monitoring 
methods, low performance of the private players and even the failure of the PPP projects. 
However, agency theory also has notable weaknesses. The theory relies on narrow assumptions 
of human nature and motivation, and automatically attributes negative intentions to actors while 
overlooking how uncertainty, incompleteness of information and routine behaviour may cause 
failure by themselves. When reading our empirical accounts later on, this bias should therefore 
be borne in mind. Moreover, many applications of agency theory take inadequate account of the 
wider institutional environment in which contracting processes take place. Agency theory often 
cannot capture the existence and influence of multiple principals and other third parties outside 
the direct agency relationship. Being aware of the latter limitation (the former one is inherent to 
agency theory and cannot be ‘fixed’), we attempt to mitigate this weakness through a 
complementary institutional framework. Williamson (2000) offers a useful multi-layer framework 
that allows analyzing and understanding different types of social and institutional arrangements 
in four integrated layers. In multi-layer systems, top-down and bottom-up causation interact: 
upper levels enable and impose constraints on lower levels and vice versa (Bauer 2009). 
Williamson’s framework can enrich agency theory to build up a more comprehensive conceptual 
model (figure 2). This conceptual model can help us to obtain more detailed insights in how and 
where strategic behaviour can emerge in the management of expressways, and when it is 
observed in combination, it shows the breeding ground for and occurrence of strategic behaviour. 
? Level 1: Wider cultural context 
The first is the level of social-embeddedness, where the informal institutions (such as norms, 
customs, traditions, religions) and degree of trust are located. Since such informal institutions 
change slowly, they are taken as given. We put the informal institutions at the top level because 
they form the roots of human behaviours. Whether or not private players exhibit strategic 
behaviours in the third and fourth levels largely depends on the informal environment where 
they are socially embedded. In addition, we also put the degree of trust at this level for the reason 
that a nation’s trust level will affect how policies should be made by governments in the second 
level when dealing with strategic behaviour. Therefore, we need to briefly clarify the trust levels 
in the Chinese context and we will return to them in the concluding section, when implications 
for Europe are discussed. 
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Definitions of trust abound, but the essence is one of a psychological state comprising the 
intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the behaviour of other 
actors. In the context of a project, trust is a disposition of the willingness to rely on the actions of 
another party, under the circumstance of contractual and social obligations with the potential to 
collaboration (Smyth and Edkins, 2007). In China, the degree of trust is regarded as relatively low 
compared to countries such as Germany and Japan (Fukuyama 1995, Ragunathan 2007). The 
disadvantages of a nation with low trust levels include that agency costs (including the costs of 
providing incentives for the agents and executing monitoring methods on the agents) would be 
higher; reliance on institutions such as legislations and regulations would be lower; informal 
processes among mutually familiar individuals correspondingly higher.  
 
Figure 2. Multi-layered model of the PPP contracting process 
 
? Level 2: Formal institutions 
At the second level, the formal institutions, including official legislation and regulations and the 
organizational structures can be found. According to North (1990), these institutions are the 
formal rules of the game. Their major role in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a 
stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction. A well-developed and stable 
institutional environment is favourable for applying successful project management in general 
and PPP in particular, since it diminishes unnecessary ambiguity and potential for contention 
among players. 
? Level 3: Strategic behaviour before signing contracts 
Under the institutions, both formal and informal, the third level, tendering, is located as a 
beginning of PPP projects. During tendering processes, principals face big challenges in selecting 
the optimal contractor and thus avoiding adverse selection. More favourable conditions in levels 
1 and 2 may improve the starting position here and make various forms of strategic behaviour 
more difficult or costly. 
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? Level 4: Strategic behaviour after signing contracts 
Even if level 3 is favourably organized, prevention of ex post strategic behaviour, moral hazard, 
has not been ensured. When the contract has been awarded, during the phases of design, 
construction, operation and maintenance, the contractor can still use tactics inconsistent with the 
clauses defined in the contract, shirk from duties and display doubtful morality in performing its 
tasks. 
This conceptual model is applied in our empirical research. This article does not aim at exploring 
problems at the social embeddedness level, so we take the Chinese socio-cultural environment, 
including its trust level as given. But, we must be aware that this environment plays a role in 
directing people’s behaviour and thus may act as a breeding ground for strategic behaviour in 
PPP projects. As to the formal institutions at the second level, they also affect the emergence of 
strategic behaviour in PPP projects because and unfavourable institutional environment may 
provide involved actors with room for pernicious tactics. In the empirical work for this article, we 
have focused on the institutional levels 3 and 4, while formulating our policy recommendations 
in section 5 mainly in terms of possible legal improvement for level 2. In section 3, our general 
findings on the various forms of strategic behaviour as they exist all over China are presented. 
They are based on listed national reports and national experts and policy-makers, which have 
been analysed and systematised. Section 4 will then shift to the case studies of three projects in 
three different provinces, thus focusing more in details on the physical circumstances and 
outcomes of strategic behaviour.  
3. General empirical findings 
3.1 Strategic behavior before signing contracts 
Strategic behaviour during the tendering process centres around collusion among bidders, which 
goes against the essential objective of tendering: fair competition. This will prevent principals 
from having accurate information on the bidders. Consequently, non-optimal contractors can be 
selected. First, bidders can collude in submitting bid prices together. Such collusion would force the 
government to choose a bidder from those whose bid prices are all high. In such cases, the 
government does not know the real price that each bidder can offer and is unable to make 
comparisons among them to select the optimal one since they are all at similarly (contrived) high 
levels. Fair competition is made impossible and transaction costs increase because of weak 
incentives to control project costs. In addition, collusion could imply bids with prices substantially 
lower than the normal price in order to exclude other bidders who offer at a reasonable price from winning 
the bid. Such collusion may sometimes trap the government into selecting a fallacious low-price 
bidder. This raises the risk of moral hazard emerging later on during the contract period, because 
the selected bidder will be subject to vast cost overruns and the probability that such agents can 
force off renegotiations is far higher. Therefore, transaction costs are also bound to rise. Such 
fallacious low prices generate create a so-called “investment trap” for principals, because such 
contractors will inevitably ask for supplementary funding later. Furthermore, bidders might collude 
with each other on winning the bid by turn. Such collusion strategically provides bidders with an 
average opportunity of winning the contract even if the bidder is actually incapable of carrying 
out the project. Tendering in such cases is meaningless and competition is absent because the 
winner has been determined surreptitiously by the bidders. The principal is kept from selecting 
the best bidder and, as a consequence, moral hazard is likely to occur during the construction 
process (Qiao, 2008; Huang, 2007; Dang and Zu, 2006; Zu, 2005). Collusion among the bidders 
may provide them with a stronger position individually or jointly against the principal to either 
raise the bid price or win the contract. The asymmetric distribution of the information on the 
actual capabilities and capacities of the bidders also offers the bidders the motivation to collude. 
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3.2 Strategic behaviour after signing contracts 
After contractor selection, strategic behaviour can take place during the construction period. 
Several forms of moral hazard that might impair project quality have been detected (Wei, 2001; 
Liu, 2000; Ouyang, 2007). Moral hazard may be caused by technical jerry-builds. Such strategic 
behaviour can be expected from contractors that are technically advanced and thus know with 
great accuracy to what extent and what elements of the construction can be built and equipped 
with low-quality materials (such as concrete) and fewer materials (such as lower-magnitude steel 
or reinforcement). Such technically specialized information is only in the hands of the contractor. 
The consequence can be that project quality cannot be ensured according to the quality 
specifications defined in the contract and expensive maintenance operations are likely to follow 
further down the road. A variant of the above are experience-dependent jerry-builds, usually from 
contractors with abundant experience in construction activities, but lacking in technical know-
how. They might use lower-level materials or reduce the use of materials in order to save 
construction costs (and thus make excessive profits) fully relying on their experience obtained in 
past projects. During construction, information on the locations where the project is jerry-built is 
only available to the contractor. The consequences may be more serious than with technical jerry-
builds because technical factors are not even taken into consideration. Safety and security issues 
may arise and maintenance might become even more difficult and costly. There are still other 
kinds of jerry-build. Contractors aiming for excessive profits and lacking expertise and experience 
may jerry-build relying on their arbitrary discretion alone, as long as they expect their deceit to 
remain undetected. Such strategic behaviour will probably cause the most serious project quality 
issues. In China, such projects are called “doufuzha” projects, which imply that construction is 
compared to “bean curd” which is not solid and easily destroyed. 
The China Audit Office (2008) has concluded that jerry-build problems are usually caused 
through subcontracting with cheaper sub-constructors more likely to revert to strategic 
behaviour. Among a project sample in 34 provinces, 36% projects have been jerry-built for a total 
amount of 9.035 billion Yuan. For instance, the Xinjiang Road-Harbour Construction Enterprise 
won the contract for an expressway from Bengbu to Guangming. It signed sub-contracting 
contracts with 36 small construction firms that rarely qualified for their jobs and thus economized 
on its actual project costs from 84.97 to 65.51 million Yuan (19.46 in excess). Of course, the 
subcontractors used fewer and lower-quality materials. Even more dramatically, in Chongqing, 
the Chang-Wang expressway (from Changshou to Wanzhou) was transferred to sub-sub-sub 
constructors (four levels down), thus reducing the amount available for project construction by 
69%. 
Strategic behaviour during operation and maintenance, a second form of moral hazard in 
expressway management, refers to private agents obtaining excess profits from road users by 
extending the charging period, increasing the number of tollbooths and reducing expenditure on 
maintenance. They may strategically extend the charging period. Theoretically speaking, the 
charging period (i.e. the operating period) has been defined in PPP contracts, but operators still 
want to extend this period in order to earn additional sums at the expense of the public. They 
claim that the period should be extended due to unforeseen or uncontrollable factors and that 
normal profit could not be ensured (due to exceptional bad weather conditions or an initial 
overestimation of traffic demand). If an agent puts forward the extension requirement, extra 
workload is imposed on the principal to audit the operator’s accounting sheets and set up 
renegotiations. As a result, transaction costs rise. Agents may also strategically increase the number 
of tollbooths. The number of tollbooths is normally determined in the contract, whereas relevant 
legislation (the Expressway Law and the Ordinance on the Administration on Toll Roads) 
stipulates the method of establish the location of tollbooths. However, operator can strategically 
increase toll income by shortening the distance between payment points. Excess numbers of 
tollbooths could be easily detected if principals took action. But in practice, this supervision 
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rarely is undertaken, since monitoring is expensive and time-consuming. Finally, it is common 
that private operators strategically reduce maintenance spending. Regulation on expressway 
maintenance in China is classified in four types: routine maintenance; periodic maintenance; 
special maintenance; and amelioration maintenance. Currently, according to officials of the 
Department of Communication in Liaoning Province, only amelioration maintenance can be 
safeguarded. This is because when amelioration maintenance is due, the government will join 
and provide technical and managerial support for private operators and monitor their work. But 
for routine and periodic maintenance, transaction costs of monitoring are deemed too high. 
Therefore, the operators then have more opportunities to behave strategically and to reduce the 
frequency of maintenance activities. As a consequence, the road condition tends to deteriorate. 
The China Audit Office (2008) reveals many examples of moral hazard problems during project 
operation and maintenance. It writes that the most serious problem in China is the increase in the 
number of tollbooths. The investigation was conducted in 18 provinces, and 16 of them turned 
out to face these issues. The figures indicate that in these 16 provinces, 158 illegal tollbooths were 
detected (that is, without license permits) and until late 2005 the incurred user fees from them 
amounted to 14.9 billion Yuan. It was estimated that if these illegal tollbooths had not been 
cancelled, operators would have charged 19.5 billion Yuan extra until the expiry dates of their 
operating rights. And for some expressways the charging periods of which have not yet expired, 
still 66 illegal tollbooths are still operating. 
These empirical findings were mainly found in listed reports and through face-to-face interviews 
with relevant experts and policy makers in China. They showed what types of strategic 
behaviour exist in the processes of tendering, construction, maintenance and operation for PPP 
expressways in China. In the next section, we will present three specific cases that supplement 
the empirical findings. 
4. Case studies 
In this section, we extend the empirical research by studying three Chinese expressway cases 
(figure 3). Theoretically speaking, methodologists are strict with the selection of cases in 
analytical and comparative research in terms of their critical and representative properties. But in 
reality it is to some extent hard to access ideal cases illustrating all the aspects of the preceding 
discussed theory. Here, the selection of cases is based on other grounds, including the availability 
of data and empirical materials; the practical feasibility of content analysis; and the accessibility 
to the interviewees. The selected cases are Shen-Da expressway in Liaoning; Citong bridge in 
Fujian; and He-Chao-Wu expressway in Anhui, in three different provinces all over the country. 
4.1 The Shen-Da expressway in Liaoning province 
The Shen-Da Expressway connecting Shenyang and Dalian (Shen and Da) is the first expressway 
in China that was planned in early 1980s and adopted the Build-Transfer (BT) model in its 
construction (figure 4). Its construction started in 1984 and was completed in 1990 with a total 
length of 375 km, including 27 interchanges, 148 bridges, 451 culverts, 7 rest areas and 7 control 
centres. It has political significance because it enhances regional economic development by 
connecting the two major cities in Liaoning with each other. It was designed with 4 lanes for both 
directions initially in 1980s, and after 10 years operation, in 2000, the traffic volume had reached 
6739 cars per day with yearly traffic amount increase by 11.8%, and thus the traffic amount in 
2000 has been already 20613 cars per day. Confronting such an increase in traffic volume, the 
expressway was widened into 8 lanes for bidirectional carriageways in 2002 after careful 
evaluations in terms of costs and benefits by Liaoning People’s Government and Liaoning 
Department of Communication. After 3 years, the expressway opened again in 2005 with fully 
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new constructed lanes and supporting facilities such as new rest areas and computerized monitor 
systems.  
 
Figure 3. The Chinese plan for expressways and the selected cases 
 
 
Figure 4. Shen-Da expressway 
 
The Liaoning Department of Communication commissioned the Liaoning Transportation Plan 
and Design Institute to carry out an inspection of the project quality 10 years after the road 
opened in 1990. The inspection results showed that the minimum surface deformation value 
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along Shen-Da expressway was 40, which was much larger than the designed maximum value of 
30. And over a stretch over 174 km of the expressway, a deformation value of around 70 was 
found, another 137km with a deformation between 70 and 120, and another 38km with a 
deformation higher than 120. Furthermore, after examination it appeared that the foundation 
layers of some parts of the expressway were thinner than the designed value and that the asphalt 
layer and the foundation layer had been separated from each other. Finally, 222 jerry-build 
locations were demonstrated where construction elements had not been built according to the 
technical terms defined in the contract. 
Logical analysis would show the following. First, adverse selection of the contractor may cause 
serious problems during project design, construction and operation. In this case, the constructors 
of the old expressway and the new one were the same state-owned road construction corporation 
and they were automatically appointed for the job. The selection process was not based on 
competitive tendering and consequently no comparisons were made by the government to 
choose the optimal constructor. Second, after the constructor selection, moral hazard problems 
must have taken place in the construction process. Because of the lack of good incentives and the 
absence of monitoring, 222 jerry build locations were found. During the construction of the old 
expressway, the state-owned enterprise lacked accountability for project quality, and although 
the consequences were not detected at project completion in 1990, they led to serious problems 
further down the road. During reconstruction and extension of the old road, this state-owned 
enterprise thus exerted greater efforts in dealing with the previously existing quality problems. 
4.2 The Citong bridge in Fujian province 
At 1503 meters, the Citong Bridge is one of the largest bridges in Fujian province with 6 lanes for 
both directions and the technical classification as expressways crossing the Jin River and is the 
first bridge that applied Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model in China (figure 5). The crossing is 
located approximately 10 kilometers downstream of the existing Quanzhou Bridge and traverses 
the Jin River at the point where the river is 22 meters wide. The bridge links the outside areas of 
the Quanzhou city with the inside areas. It currently lacks the connections with nearby national 
highways and expressways. 
 
Figure 5. Citong bridge 
 
The construction of the Citong Bridge was completed in late 1996 and then entered the operating 
stage. Just in the year 1997, the toll incomes had reached 0.1 billion Yuan and the profits in the 
future were very promising for the Mingliu Corporation, the private contractor selected for the 
construction and operation of this bridge. However, this good performance did not last long 
because of the Quanzhou Bridge which is operated by the Quanzhou local government. 
Competitions thus evolved between these two bridges for traffic flows. Facing the substantive 
amount of tolls, the Quanzhou local government wanted to set its monopolistic position over the 
traffic flows and thus make greater revenues from tolls. Therefore, due to the imperfect 
competition between the two bridges, the Citong Bridge has lost many of its users. Actually, the 
imperfect competition was caused by government protection of the Quanzhou Bridge with side-
policies that systematically favoured Quanzhou bridge traffic at the expense of the Citong Bridge. 
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The case of Citong Bridge revealed several institutional weaknesses in China, as indicated at the 
second level in the conceptual model. First, the role of the government in PPP should be criticized 
because the government also provoked strategic behaviour. The government should provide 
enough space or opportunities for the private actor when the project enters the operating stage in 
order to ensure that the private actor will earn back its initial investment on the BOT basis, 
because it is disastrous for the private actor to complete the project without project demands. In 
addition, the procedures for making decisions of the government should be clear and transparent 
in order to ensure that unfair and strategic decisions are absent. And only in this way public 
interests can be ensured and private actors can be given more confidence when doing business 
with government. Third, there is an absence of the enforcement of the law against unfair 
competition. As a consequence, fair competition between the public and private players as is the 
case here can be impaired by side-policies.  
4.3 The He-Chao-Wu expressway in Anhui province 
The He-Chao-Wu expressway, located in Anhui province, is one of the infrastructure projects 
belonging to the nation’s eighth five-year plan connecting the hinterland with more developed 
regions, such as Shanghai and Nanjing. Project construction started late 1992 and was completed 
in mid 2000. The road leads from Hefei, through Chaohu, and then to Wuhu (He-Chao-Wu) with 
a total length of 100 kilometer and a total investment of 3.2 billion Yuan. The He-Chao-Wu 
expressway is a typical project using the Transfer-Operate-Transfer (TOT) model, a variant of the 
BOT model. The government transfers the operating right within a certain time period to private 
actor at a lump sum price. After its completion in 2000, the Anhui government tried to operate 
the road by itself, but with the fiscal pressures for its maintenance and construction of other new 
roads, the government chose to transfer its operating rights to the private operator, Shanghai 
Eastern Holdings Limited (SEHL), with a lump sum payment in 2003. 
In 2008, the National Audit Office of China reported the auditing results for China’s toll roads 
and revealed problems in the He-Chao-Wu expressway. It reported that the operating right of 
this expressway was transferred in a strategic and nonstandard way, which led to potential 
operation problems and thus the failure of the corporation between the government and the 
private operator. According to the National Audit Office, the transfer of the operating right of the 
He-Chao-Wu expressway led to a more than one billion loss of state capital. In 2003, the 
operating right was transferred to SEHL at the price of 1.9 billion Yuan with an additional 0.6 
billion for maintenance costs. However, after two years, the operating right was bought back by 
the Anhui Government at the price of 3.58 billion Yuan. The reason for repurchasing was that 
SEHL had gone bankrupt; the operating right could not be transferred to other third parties; and 
the government wanted to ensure the continuity of the service. The reason for the loss of state 
capital is that its asset price evaluation of this expressway was flawed and artificially low. And 
the false evaluation result was approved by the local government because one of the public 
officials had accepted bribery from SEHL. As a consequence, SEHL obtained the operating right 
of the He-Chao-Wu expressway at a very low price.  
The evidence of this case shows that the actual use of PPP does not necessarily provide a positive 
contribution to infrastructures. In contrast, here it created opportunities for public officials for 
corruption. It indicates that a number of essential institutional preconditions have to be met 
before PPPs can be fruitfully put in place, according to the second level in the conceptual model. 
Especially in less developed provinces of a developing country like China, some of these 
preconditions are lacking. The preconditions, for instance, are the presence of secure private 
property legislation and solid anti-corruption law. 
The above cases showed various forms of strategic behaviour of the private players and/or 
malpractice of governments, and they revealed a certain amount of institutional weaknesses. 
Agency theory only emphasizes strategic behaviour that could be evoked by agents because of 
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asymmetric information. However, apart from those strategic actions on the part of the private 
players, we also came across public principal malpractice. Therefore, strategic behaviours are not 
only applicable to private players but also is present among governments.  
5. Institutional incentives/cures for strategic behaviour 
Strategic tendering through collusion among bidders never happens in a vacuum. To a large 
extent, collusion reflects anticipation to reactions from the tendering environments. The friendlier 
the environment is to such actions, the more likely is the emergence of collusion. Therefore, an 
environment with adequate incentives penalizing collusive behaviour needs to be built up. We 
therefore now turn to level 2 of our multi-layered conceptual model and formulate some possible 
regulatory action which the Chinese law-makers can adopt. 
First, we recommend a credible increase in the penalties for collusion attempts, proportional to the potential 
benefits from collusion. Since the motivation of collusive bidders is the potential benefit gained 
from their collusive actions, an increase in the venture costs of such behaviour relative to their 
potential benefits will discourage bidders from colluding because they will be subject to high risk 
of dramatic losses. The more costly such actions are, the less they will be attempted. Ways to raise 
venture costs may include setting up a disclosure system and awarding extremely heavy 
penalties. Bidders whose collusion is disclosed will suffer from high penalties involving not only 
economic punishment, but also administrative and legislative sanctions. Administrative and 
legislative sanctions may include the prohibition to attend future project tenders for a certain 
period of time (Feng, 2005; Song, 2005; Sun, 2007). In China, such a disclosure-penalty system has 
recently been set up, the Administration Ordinance on Strategic Behaviour in Tendering, which 
was enacted January 1st, 2009. The challenge, that is to prove collusion, is also mentioned in this 
Ordinance. It stipulates that the contractors, whose collusion has been proven, should be sent to 
provincial or national legal departments and charged with the crime of disrupting orderly 
tendering procedures and influencing the tendering results. 
Another effective countermeasure is to insist on a broad range of bidders, and if possible, to cover a larger 
territory. Tendering under a small group of bidders will increase the possibility of collusion 
because it creates an easy environment for bidders to communicate with each other. The 
information obtained through such strategic communication gives bidders an advantage over the 
government during the tendering process, making collusion more likely. Having a broad range of 
bidders makes this much more complicated. In addition, bidders in other regions where the 
project is not located need to be invited because in some regions bidders know each other too 
well. Strategic communication and exchange of information can evolve almost naturally. One 
shortcoming of this method is that it will increase transaction costs of the tendering process 
because of an increase in the number of submitted documents (Song, 2005; Sun, 2007; Li et al 
2007).  
We also recommend the use of ‘semi-transparency policy’ which entails that the government knows all the 
bidders, while each single bidder does not know who the other bidders are. One effective measure to 
avoid strategic behaviour is to reduce information advantages of the agents. Thus the bidders are 
insulated from each other and operate back-to-back. Here, “semi-” does not mean that the 
tendering procedures and selection criteria are opaque to the government, but means that 
information between the government and bidders is one-way and favours the principal. In China, 
few project tenders have adopted this insulated manner to select a contractor, but we hope its 
popularity will grow (Li et al, 2007). 
The fourth recommendation is to adopt a multi-dimensional evaluation method to determine the optimal 
contractor, which depends on multiple aspects of the various bids. The advantage behind this approach 
is to establish whether the bidder is cheating or not. Here, evaluation is done not only by means 
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of comparisons among bidders (horizontal dimension), but also by intra-bid comparisons 
(vertical dimension). The function of intra-bid comparisons is to examine whether the bid price 
submitted is consistent with the bidder’s technological and management capabilities. If there is a 
substantial gap between the bidding price and the actual price according to the bidder’s 
capacities, then likelihood of cheating is overwhelming. Currently in China, vertical evaluation of 
bidders is rare (Song, 2005). 
Moral hazard during the construction phase is a key problem, since it delivers lower 
infrastructure quality and requires higher spending on maintenance. Not least, it affects safety 
negatively. Below, we propose some suggestions for more adequate incentives on this aspect. 
First, we propose fixed-price contracts with periodical payments by the government. In China, fixed-price 
contracts are applied in most provinces, offering the formula of 0/100 (principal/agent) in the 
case of a fixed-price incentive contract. Therefore, incentives for cost-saving are not a problem, 
but when the constructor realizes that it is unable to make profits from a project as a result of bad 
cost management, it may unilaterally give up the project. And because of information asymmetry 
regarding actual project costs, the government may not be able to retrieve the initial investment. 
Therefore, we recommend using a short-term periodical payment system, in which the 
government pays the constructor for its work monthly after evaluating project quality and 
schedule. In this way, the constructor will not strategically terminate the contract because it may 
only obtain the amount of payment according to the work done. Even if the constructor 
terminates the contract, the government might continue the project by contracting with others. 
Also, incentives to jerry-build can be reduced through employing a construction monitoring group to 
ensure project quality. Construction monitoring may be effective in supervising project quality and 
provide technical support for the constructor. In China, expressway construction has been 
regulated in that construction cannot start until the monitoring group is ready. A construction 
monitoring group that has advanced expertise in building techniques and technologies is able to 
prevent jerry-build by the constructor. However, a new problem may appear. The relation 
between the government and the monitoring group can also be seen as a principal-agent relation 
and thus the government may be subject to moral hazard by the monitoring group as well. There 
is even the possibility that the constructor and the monitoring group collude with each other. 
Therefore, a complementary measure can be suggested, known as the policy of personal lifetime 
project liability. It aims at making individuals carry lifetime liability for what they have done in 
projects. Such a method can be a strong incentive for them to be accountable during their 
construction and monitoring activities. For instance, if a project suffers from quality issues during 
the later operation phase, and jerry-builds have been proven, both the company and the 
responsible individual can be prosecuted. 
Because of the long duration of operation contracts, principals face a hard time monitoring 
operators’ performance. Under such conditions, relational contracting and reputation policies can 
provide the right incentives for operators to behave accountably. In addition, we recommend 
public hearings either as an independent solution for motivating operators to face user feedback. 
Firstly, through the adoption of “reputation policies” and “relational contracting” (Williamson, 1996a, 
1996b, 1998, 2000, 2008), a reputation credit mechanism is built up, which shows a record of the 
agent’s reputation linked to its past performance. Such an account may indicate to what extent 
each private contractor can be trusted for future projects. And the private contractor linked to a 
reputation account can be assumed to act more cautiously because morally hazardous behaviour 
will reduce its standing and influence its involvement in future projects. Therefore, reputation 
policies are more probable to make the contractor think twice and take a long-term view. In 
relational contracting, continuity in mutual relations is emphasized hopefully leading to higher 
trust levels between the partners and better understanding among both sides of relevant issues 
during contract implementation. Secondly, we recommend a system for public hearings, because the 
public is the direct beneficiary of road infrastructures and directly feels the effects of the agent’s 
EJTIR 10(1), March 2010, pp. 42-62 
Mu, de Jong and ten Heuvelhof 
56 
A Typology of Strategic Behaviour in PPPs for Expressways:  
Lessons from China and Implications for Europe 
 
service quality. It is unusual to hear the public voice in China, since no institutional facility exists 
through which road users can express their opinions. However, road users are quite likely to be 
the best monitoring organ and could effectively relay messages on poor service or doubtful road 
quality to the principal reduce its transaction costs and induce corrective action. 
6. Implications for Europe 
Strategic behaviour is rife in institutional environments that are undergoing transition and/or 
where rules of the game have been formulated in ambiguous and contradictory fashions 
(Künneke and Groenewege 2005; Künneke, Groenewegen and Auger 2009; ten Heuvelhof e.a. 
2009). Moreover, when trust levels are low, confidence in fruitful collaboration between players 
and faith in the other side not abusing one’s own foibles are below certain thresholds, making 
constructive common enterprises far harder. To cut a long story short, such conditions prevail in 
expressway management in the People’s Republic of China. Culturally speaking, trust must be 
considered rather low in the Chinese context (level 1 in figure 2). The regulatory framework is 
undergoing rapid improvement, but still showing omissions and contradictions (level 2 in figure 
2). Consequently, when it comes to the processes of tendering, construction, operation and 
maintenance for expressway infrastructures (levels 3 and 4 in figure 2, which we have focused 
on), strategic behaviour is bound to arise, as seen in sections 3 and 4. Finally, in section 5 we have 
given suggestions for law-makers to forestall or mitigate them at level 2. 
Apparently, necessary legal safeguards are not yet in place in China, although they are underway 
(Mu 2008). Most European countries rank higher on the Transparency International list than the 
PRC and can therefore safely assume that some gross examples of misconduct and corruption 
will not exist here. But although the existence and morphology of strategic behaviour in road 
management has not been mapped to the same extent as it has been done here for China, 
previous publications (OECD 2005, 2007; Transparency International 2005; Independent 
Evaluation Group of World Bank 2006; World Bank 2005) already indicate that strategic 
behaviours in construction project contracting are not a unique problem for poor countries; 
industrialized nations from United States to European member states have also faced such 
problems in their infrastructure sectors. Unsurprisingly, competition for government contracts 
can be fierce, which drives healthy economic activities forward. On the other hand, it also makes 
public procurement a hotbed for serious bribery and collusion. Global efforts, therefore, have 
been made to fight against strategic behaviours and promoting the performance of public 
projects. Furthermore, previous research shows that even in countries as spotless as Sweden, 
severe cases of constructor collusion have been found and confirmed (De Jong 2005). Public 
tendering for infrastructure construction in the Netherlands has undergone serious scrutiny in 
recent years when parliamentary investigation committees conducted studies on fraud scandals 
and staggering cost overruns in the construction of various mega-projects (Priemus et al, 2008). 
Since the above two countries enjoy high positions on the TI list and are considered to have high 
trust levels, it must be feared that countries with less favourable reputations in Europe in this 
regard, such as Italy and Bulgaria, will encounter phenomena not far removed from what we saw 
before in the Chinese context. We therefore recommend a replication of the above empirical 
study for a set of European countries. We expect that at levels 1 and 2, cross-national variation 
will be found, where some nations enjoy higher trust levels (level 1) and more sophisticated 
institutional frameworks against constructor malpractices (level 2) than others. At levels 3 and 4, 
they expect largely the same types of strategic behaviour, but these may take different shapes and 
different degrees of harmfulness depending on what levels 1 and 2 look like for each country. 
Strategic behaviour as we have observed it in this article is persistent, often pernicious and 
complicated to weed out. Eventually, the road user and tax-payer suffer the consequences. 
Devising legislation allowing for more transparency and consistency and filling contracts with 
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clever incentives are important steps towards enhancing the quality of decision-making and 
project management. We hope that our map of types of strategic behaviour can help devise such 
intelligent institutions and contracts, by indicating where corrective actions are needed to curb 
excesses of information symmetry and target costly monitoring efforts where they are most 
needed. 
Appendix 1 Interviewees 
1) The Ministry of Communication, Beijing, China 
Hua Li - Vice Head of Road Transportation Department 
2) China’s Research Institute of Road Transportation Development, Beijing 
Xiaofeng Li - Engineer of Road Transportation Development, E-mail: xf.li@rioh.cn  
3) Liaoning Department of Communication, Shenyang, Liaoning Province 
Jian Shi - Head of Road Design Section, Tel: +86 13804998028 
4) Liaoning Institute of Road Design and Plan, Shenyang, Liaoning Province 
Yuwu Sun - Head of Feasibility Study Research Group, E-mail: slee7388@sina.com  
Chao Wang - Associate Engineer of Road Design, Tel: +86(0)24 88110718 
5) Expressway Project Tendering Committee, Shenyang, Liaoning Province 
Hui Wang - Head of Tendering Department 
6) Communication Bank of China, Liaoning Branch 
Shuguang Tan - Head of the Lending Department 
7) Agriculture Bank of China, Liaoning Branch 
Wenqi Han - Head of the Lending Department, Mobile phone: +86 13804995209 
8) Liaoning Lijie Consultancy Firm, Dalian, Liaoning Province 
Li Liu - Chairman Board, E-mail: liuli@cnpmi.com  
Yushan Liu - Standing Director, E-mail: lyslndl@163.com  
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